David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54 (1991)
Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is "everything" a body with a mind can do? Turing's original "pen-pal" version (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
|Keywords||Artificial intelligence causality cognition computation explanation mind/body problem other-minds problem robotics Searle symbol grounding Turing Test|
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Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Ned Block (1991). Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
Max Velmans (1991). Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
David Navon (1991). The Function of Consciousness or of Information? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):690-691.
Christof Koch & Francis Crick (1991). Understanding Awareness at the Neuronal Level. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-685.
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