On the predilections for predictions

Abstract
Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. Predictivism is the view that, ceteris paribus, correctly predicting data confers greater confirmation than successfully accommodating data. In this paper, I take issue with a variety of predictivist theses, argue that their role for issues of confirmation is extremely limited, and attempt to account for the appeal that predictivism has enjoyed. Introduction Temporal Predictivism Heuristic Predictivism Weak Predictivism 4.1 Inference to better theories 4.2 Inference to better methods Arguments for Strong Heuristic Predictivism 5.1 Best explanations argument 5.2 Conditional support 5.3 Unique explanations Increased Explanatory Unification 6.1 Explaining what other theories can't 6.2 Contrived hypotheses 6.2 Strength and simplicity Conclusions CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
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References found in this work BETA
E. C. Barnes (2002). Neither Truth nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):418 – 431.
E. C. Barnes (2005). Predictivism for Pluralists. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.

View all 18 references

Citations of this work BETA
David Harker (2010). Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):192-202.

View all 9 citations

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David Harker (2006). Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):309-321.
Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.
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E. C. Barnes (2005). Predictivism for Pluralists. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Eric Christian Barnes (2005). Predictivism for Pluralists. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3).
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