David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453 (2008)
Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. Predictivism is the view that, ceteris paribus, correctly predicting data confers greater confirmation than successfully accommodating data. In this paper, I take issue with a variety of predictivist theses, argue that their role for issues of confirmation is extremely limited, and attempt to account for the appeal that predictivism has enjoyed. Introduction Temporal Predictivism Heuristic Predictivism Weak Predictivism 4.1 Inference to better theories 4.2 Inference to better methods Arguments for Strong Heuristic Predictivism 5.1 Best explanations argument 5.2 Conditional support 5.3 Unique explanations Increased Explanatory Unification 6.1 Explaining what other theories can't 6.2 Contrived hypotheses 6.2 Strength and simplicity Conclusions CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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References found in this work BETA
John Worrall (1989). Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.
Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober (2004). Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.
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Citations of this work BETA
D. Harker (2013). How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):79-106.
Darrell P. Rowbottom & R. McNeill Alexander (2012). The Role of Hypotheses in Biomechanical Research. Science in Context 25 (2):247-262.
Heather Douglas & P. D. Magnus (2013). State of the Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):580-589.
Kevin McCain (2012). A Predictivist Argument Against Scepticism. Analysis 72 (4):660-665.
Ioannis Votsis (2014). Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):70-78.
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Eric C. Barnes (2008). The Paradox of Predictivism. Cambridge University Press.
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