Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals

Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262 (1975)
Abstract
This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00485309
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,898
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

35 ( #115,657 of 1,907,403 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #77,700 of 1,907,403 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.