Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals

Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262 (1975)
This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Ellis (1973). The Logic of Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):125-152.
William L. Harper & Henry E. Kyburg (1968). Discussions: The Jones Case. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):247-251.

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