Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28 (1992)
|Abstract||In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" would work between psychology and neuroscience|
|Keywords||Brain Neuroscience Psychology Reductionism Science Kitcher, P|
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