Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice

Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (02):115- (1985)
Utilitarianism and the Concept of Social Utility In this paper I propose to discuss the concepts of equality and justice from a rule utilitarian point of view, after some comments on the rule utilitarian point of view itself. Let me start with the standard definitions. Act utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is one that in the existing situation will produce the highest expected social utility. In contrast, rule utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is simply an action conforming to the correct moral rule applicable to the existing situation. The correct moral rule itself is that particular behavioral rule that would yield the highest expected social utility if it were followed by all morally motivated people in all similar situations
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S. Scheffler & V. Munoz-Dardé (2005). Equality and Division: Values in Principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (79):255-284.
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