|Abstract||This is a paperback reissue of a 1988 special issue of Cognition - dated but still of interest. The book consists of three chapters, each making one major negative point about connectionism. Fodor & Pylyshyn (F&P) argue that connectionist networks (henceforth 'nets') are not good models for cognition because they lack 'systematicity', Pinker & Price (P&P) argue that nets are not good substitutes for rule-based models of linguistic ability, and Lachter & Bever (L&B) argue that nets can only model the associative relations between cognitive structures, not the structures themselves.|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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