Online research in philosophy

An observer attempts to infer the unobserved ranking of two ideal objects, A and B, from observed rankings in which these objects are `accompanied' by `noise' components, C and D. In the first ranking, A is accompanied by C and B is accompanied by D, while in the second ranking, A is accompanied by D and B is accompanied by C. In both rankings, noisy-A is ranked above noisy-B. The observer infers that ideal-A is ranked above ideal-B. This commonly used inference rule is formalized for the case in which A,B,C,D are sets. Let X be a finite set and let be a linear ordering on 2X. The following condition is imposed on . For every quadruple (A,B,C,D)∈Y, where Y is some domain in (2X)4, if and , then . The implications and interpretation of this condition for various domains Y are discussed.

In this paper I attempt to defuse a set of epistemic worries commonly raised against ideal observer theories. The worries arise because of the omniscience often attributed to ideal observers -- how can we, as finite humans, ever have access to the moral judgements or reactions of omniscient beings? I argue that many of the same concerns arise with respect to other moral theories (and that these concerns do not in fact reveal genuine flaws in any of these theories), and further, that we can and often do have knowledge of the reactions of ideal observers (according to standard, prominent theories in the domain of epistemology).

The "observer" approach is investigated as a device for developing ethical theory, not for its use in private moral decision-making. Earlier discussions by Firth, Brandt, Harrison and Aiken of the impartial spectator are related to eighteenth-century British and German ethics using this theme, in order to uncover the meanings of the observer theory. Advantages and disadvantages of this approach to ethics are then examined, and the conclusion is that it does not provide a complete basis for ethical discourse but is of limited use in developing some general principles in a ruleethics.

The ideal observer theory provides a fruitful framework for doing environmental ethics. It is not homocentric, it can illuminate the relationship between religious and nonreligious ethics, and it has implications for normative environmental issues. I defend it against eritieism raised by Thomas Carson and Jonathan Harrison.