David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 140 (3):331-353 (2004)
Van Fraassen maintains that the information that we canglean from experience is limited to those entities and processes that are detectable bymeans of our unaided senses. His challenge to the realist, I suggest, is that the attemptto inferentially transcend those limits amounts to a reversion to rationalism. Under pressurefrom such examples as microscopic observation, he has recently widened the scope of thephenomena to include object-like experiences without empirical objects of experience.With this change in mind, I argue that van Fraassen needs an account of perception whoseconsequence is that we can only see what we see with the unaided eye. I then argue thatreflection on the epistemically significant aspects of the perceptual process rendersvan Fraassen's characterization of the limits of experience implausible; technologicallyenhanced perception brings ``unobservables'' within those limits. An empiricismthat is compatible with realism results
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616.
Adam Toon (2014). Empiricism for Cyborgs. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):409-425.
Martin Kusch (2015). Microscopes and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Bas van Fraassen’s Recent Work. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):167-182.
Similar books and articles
Federica Russo (2006). Salmon and Van Fraassen on the Existence of Unobservable Entities: A Matter of Interpretation of Probability. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 11 (3):221-247.
Sara Vollmer (2000). Two Kinds of Observation: Why Van Fraassen Was Right to Make a Distinction, but Made the Wrong One. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):355-365.
Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.
Stathis Psillos (2007). Putting a Bridle on Irrationality : An Appraisal of Van Fraassen's New Epistemology. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press 288-319.
Patrick Maher (1990). Acceptance Without Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
William Seager (1988). Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:181-187.
Jeff Foss (1991). On Saving the Phenomena and the Mice: A Reply to Bourgeois Concerning Van Fraassen's Image of Science. Philosophy of Science 58 (2):278-287.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads194 ( #11,057 of 1,780,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #80,127 of 1,780,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?