David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Churchland underestimates the power and purpose of the Turing Test, dismissing it as the trivial game to which the Loebner Prize (offered for the computer program that can fool judges into thinking it's human) has reduced it, whereas it is really an exacting empirical criterion: It requires that the candidate model for the mind have our full behavioral capacities -- so fully that it is indistinguishable from any of us, to any of us (not just for one Contest night, but for a lifetime). Scaling up to such a model is (or ought to be) the programme of that branch of reverse bioengineering called cognitive science. It's harmless enough to do the hermeneutics after the research has been successfully completed, but self-deluding and question-begging to do it before.
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