Husserl Studies 22 (3):223-240 (2006)
|Abstract||The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more precise Husserl's ethical position.|
|Keywords||I Person Individual Absolute Ought Truth of will Georg Simmel|
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