Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78 - 104 (2004)
|Abstract||If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. I employ a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to naïve set theory? Probably not, but limiting naïve comprehension in set theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property theory used for semantics|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kazushige Terui (2004). Light Affine Set Theory: A Naive Set Theory of Polynomial Time. Studia Logica 77 (1):9 - 40.
Susan Rogerson & Greg Restall (2004). Routes to Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):421-436.
Elia Zardini (2008). A Model of Tolerance. Studia Logica 90 (3):337 - 368.
Zach Weber (2010). Extensionality and Restriction in Naive Set Theory. Studia Logica 94 (1):87 - 104.
Loïc Colson (2007). Another Paradox in Naive Set-Theory. Studia Logica 85 (1):33 - 39.
Michael Glanzberg (2003). Minimalism and Paradoxes. Synthese 135 (1):13 - 36.
A. Weir (1998). Naïve Set Theory is Innocent! Mind 107 (428):763-798.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #17,310 of 722,713 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,873 of 722,713 )
How can I increase my downloads?