David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):23-34 (2003)
Two conceptions of a priori methods and assumptions can be distinguished. First, there are the assumptions and methods accepted prior to a given inquiry. Second, there are innate assumptions and methods. For each of these two types of a priori methods and assumptions, we can also allow cases in which one starts with something that is a priori and is justified in reaching a new belief or procedure without making any appeal to new experiential data. But we should not suppose there is some further sort of a priori explained in terms of some other notion of justification. If we try to construct a notion of the a priori by considering ways in which knowledge, belief, or reasoning might be though to be directly a priori, via direct insight, inability to imagine something false, intentions about use of language, and the language faculty, the resulting conception of the a prior in each of these cases reduces to either of the first two conceptions
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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua C. Thurow (2009). The a Priori Defended: A Defense of the Generality Argument. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):273-289.
Joshua C. Thurow (2013). Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to Be Irrational? The Epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science of Religion. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):77-98.
Joshua C. Thurow (2009). The a Priori Defended: A Defense of the Generality Argument. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):273 - 289.
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