David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (4):409-426 (2011)
Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism and Popperian falsificationism to economics. Yet his apparent inconsistency in maintaining all of these positions seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature. Previously I have criticized attempts to characterize Hutchison as a positivist or ultra-empiricist. In this article I argue that Klappholz and Agassi failed to support their claim that Hutchison introduced Popper's criterion to economics. That is, this paper deals with this specific question, rather than the wider one of whether or not Hutchison introduced Popperian falsificationism to economics. Yet the two issues are closely connected and so the latter question is briefly discussed. To the extent that the paper succeeds, it may help to resolve the inconsistency problem. For now it is possible that Hutchison in 1938 developed his own original and consistent position. The task of substantiating such a view by providing a positive account of his methodology is one for the future.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Karl R. Popper (1989/2002). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge.
W. V. Quine (1953/1980). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
Karl R. Popper (1966). The Open Society and its Enemies. London, Routledge & K. Paul.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Hart (2003). Terence Hutchison's 1938 Essay: Towards a Reappraisal. Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (3):353-373.
John Hart (2009). Machlup's Misrepresentation of Hutchison's Methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):325-340.
John Hart (2002). A Conversation with Terence Hutchison. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (3):359-377.
John Hart (2010). Terence Hutchison and Frank Knight: A Reappraisal of Their 1940–1941 Exchange. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (4):359-373.
Ross B. Emmett (2009). Realism and Relevance in the Economics of a Free Society: The Knight–Hutchison Debate. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):341-350.
Roger E. Backhouse (2009). An Unfinished Manuscript by Terence Hutchison. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):293-296.
Bruce Caldwell (2009). A Skirmish in the Popper Wars: Hutchison Versus Caldwell on Hayek, Popper, Mises, and Methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):315-324.
T. W. Hutchison (2009). A Formative Decade: Methodological Controversy in the 1930s. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):297-314.
T. W. Hutchison (1999). 'Ultra-Deductivism', Perfect Knowledge and the Methodology of Economics: Some Lingering Doubts. Journal of Economic Methodology 6 (1):131-132.
Julia K. Hutchison (2000). John A. Hutchison, 1912-2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (2):111 - 112.
Terence Hutchison (1998). Ultra-Deductivism From Nassau Senior to Lionel Robbins and Daniel Hausman. Journal of Economic Methodology 5 (1):43-91.
Geert Reuten (1997). What About Falsifiability? Further Notes on Hausman's Revision of the Neoclassical Economic Methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (2):297-302.
Lawrence A. Boland (1998). Situational Analysis Beyond Neoclassical Economists. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (4):515-521.
D. Wade Hands (2003). Did Milton Friedman's Methodology License the Formalist Revolution? Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (4):507-520.
David N. Stamos (2007). Popper, Laws, and the Exclusion of Biology From Genuine Science. Acta Biotheoretica 55 (4):357-375.
Added to index2012-02-20
Total downloads6 ( #336,406 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?