Philosophy 74 (1):5-28 (1999)
|Abstract||The gist of these objections to the possible world account of necessity is that, for it to be true, ‘possible’ would have to be a name for an attribute. But to say that something is possible is not to describe it, but to say that there could be such a thing. And possibilities are not classes of entities. Possible worlds have been described as ways, but a way of getting to London from Cambridge is not an entity, and that there is a way is entailed by facts such as that if you travel south along the M3, you will get there.|
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