The inconsistent scientific realist

Philosophical Studies 30 (3):203 - 205 (1976)
Many philosophers who consider themselves scientific realists also argue for physicalism (quine is one). But if scientific realism is construed in such a way that it is logically independent of physicalism, One cannot consistently defend both positions. If it is construed so that it is not independent of physicalism, The problem is simply displaced to an incoherence within scientific realism. "historical physicalism" is what scientific realists should be defending. But so far no scientific realists have defended this version of physicalism
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355277
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