Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):559-575 (2006)
|Abstract||The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not.|
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