David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):173 - 198 (2003)
Many people face a problem about potentiality: their moral beliefs appear to dictate inconsistent views about the signiﬁcance of the potentiality to become a healthy adult. Brieﬂy, the problem arises as follows. Consider the following two claims. First, both human babies and cats have moral status, but harms to babies matter more, morally, than similar harms to cats. Second, early human embryos lack moral status. It appears that the ﬁrst claim can only be true if human babies have more moral status than cats. Among the properties that determine moral status, human babies have no properties other than their potentiality that could explain their having more moral status than cats. So human babies’ potentiality to become adult persons must explain their having more moral status than cats. But then potentiality must raise moral status generally. So early human embryos must have some moral status. It appears that the view that must underlie the ﬁrst claim implies that the second claim is false.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating? Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
David Degrazia (2007). Human-Animal Chimeras: Human Dignity, Moral Status, and Species Prejudice. Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):309–329.
Elizabeth Harman (2007). How is the Ethics of Stem Cell Research Different From the Ethics of Abortion? Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):207–225.
David DeGrazia (2014). Persons, Dolphins, and Human–Nonhuman Chimeras. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (2):17-18.
Jennifer Church (2010). Seeing Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):638-670.
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