David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl (1983) asked participants to report the moment at which they freely decided to initiate a pre-specified movement, based on the position of a red marker on a clock. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), Libet found that the subjective feeling of deciding to perform a voluntary action came after the onset of the motor “readiness potential,” RP). This counterintuitive conclusion poses a challenge for the philosophical notion of free will. Faced with these findings, Libet (1985) proposed that conscious volitional control might operate as a selector and a controller of volitional processes rather than as an initiator of them.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alexander Batthyany (2009). Mental Causation and Free Will After Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency. In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
Gilberto Gomes (1999). Volition and the Readiness Potential. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.
Storrs McCall (2013). Does the Brain Lead the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):262-265.
Benjamin Libet, C. Gleason, E. Wright & D. Pearl (1983). Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential). The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act. Brain 106:623--664.
Daniel N. Robinson (2012). Determinism: Did Libet Make the Case? Philosophy 87 (03):395-401.
Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Timing of Conscious Experience: Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet's Findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
Benjamin W. Libet (1978). Neuronal Vs. Subjective Timing for a Conscious Sensory Experience. In P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (eds.), Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier.
Benjamin Libet, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) (2010). Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press.
Daniel von Wachter, Libet's Experiment Provides No Evidence Against Strong Libertarian Free Will Because Readiness Potentials Do Not Cause Our Actions.
Gilberto Gomes (1998). The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet's Research. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
Benjamin W. Libet (1981). Timing of Cerebral Processes Relative to Concomitant Conscious Experiences in Man. In G. Adam, I. Meszaros & E.I. Banyai (eds.), Advances in Physiological Science.
Max Velmans (2003). Preconscious Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
Neil Levy (2005). Libet's Impossible Demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
Alfred R. Mele (2011). Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness. In W. Sinnot-Armstrong & L. Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 23--33.
Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem (2005). On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads9 ( #128,813 of 1,088,398 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,398 )
How can I increase my downloads?