Wittgenstein and artificial intelligence

Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):105 – 115 (1988)
Recent studies of Wittgenstein's later writing have made clear that they stand as a defence of two main ideas: that scepticism about the possibility of interpersonal discussions about our subjective feelings is misplaced and, as a seemingly startling corollary; that a mind state account of most 'mental activities' is incoherent. This leads to a great emphasis on skills and practices which, a fortiori, are definable only relationally, by reference to targets. In this paper I try to show that the 'computer' analogue for the mind f ails on both of Wittgenstein's dimensions. There are no physiognomic language games in the computer centre, while the 'target' aspect of skill and practice concepts ties them in to a wholly human world.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515088808572928
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Martel Johnson (1988). Brutes Believe Not. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):279-294.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

24 ( #124,740 of 1,725,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,836 of 1,725,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.