Why and how we are not zombies
(1995)
| Abstract | A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesStevan Harnad (1994). Why and How We Are Not Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164-67.
Robert Kirk (ed.) (2006/2007). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.
Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie Killer. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.
Torin Alter (2007). Imagining Subjective Absence: Marcus on Zombies. Disputatio 2:91-101.
David Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads21 ( #58,767 of 549,113 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,113 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
