Who One is , Book 1: A Meontology of the "I"

Springer (2009)
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Abstract

I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristics; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration raises issues in phenomenological ontology of identity, individuation, and substance

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James G. Hart
Indiana University, Bloomington

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