In Michael A. Bishop & John M. Preston (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press (2001)
|Abstract||Searle's Chinese Room Argument showed a fatal flaw in computationalism (the idea that mental states are just computational states) and helped usher in the era of situated robotics and symbol grounding (although Searle himself thought neuroscience was the only correct way to understand the mind)|
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