Alston on the Rationality of Doxastic Practices

Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):205-211 (2010)
John Turri claims to have refuted the main argument of William Alston’s Perceiving God. He contests Alston’s claim that “for any established doxastic practice it is rational to suppose that it is reliable.” I show that Turri has misinterpreted Alston at several key points, and that his refutation of Alston’s argument fails
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