Alston on the Rationality of Doxastic Practices

Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):205-211 (2010)
John Turri claims to have refuted the main argument of William Alston’s Perceiving God. He contests Alston’s claim that “for any established doxastic practice it is rational to suppose that it is reliable.” I show that Turri has misinterpreted Alston at several key points, and that his refutation of Alston’s argument fails
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/faithphil201027219
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael B. Wakoff (1999). Alston's Practical Rationality Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:247-284.
Philip L. Quinn (1999). Epistemological Problems of Religious Pluralism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:19-27.
Richard Gale (1994). Why Alston's Mystical Doxastic Practice Is Subjective. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):869 - 875.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

13 ( #191,673 of 1,725,992 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #167,084 of 1,725,992 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.