All too skeptical theism

Abstract
Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself
Keywords Skeptical theism  Evidential argument from evil  Inductive skepticism  Moral skepticism  Unjustified evil
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    References found in this work BETA
    William Rowe (1988). Evil and Theodicy. Philosophical Topics 16 (2):119-132.
    William Rowe (1986). The Empirical Argument From Evil. In William Wainwright & Robert Audi (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment. Cornell University Press. 227--247.
    William L. Rowe (1991). Ruminations About Evil. Philosophical Perspectives 5:69-88.
    William L. Rowe (1979). The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    David James Anderson (2012). Skeptical Theism and Value Judgments. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1):27-39.
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