Explanatory priority: Transitive and unequivocal, a reply to William Craig

According to William Craig, the notion of explanatory priority is the Achilles' heel of Robert Adams' argument against Molinism. Specifically, Craig contends that (1) the notion of explanatory priority is employed equivocally in the argument; (2) Adams is guilty of conflating reasons and causes; and (3) one of the intermediate conclusions of the argument is invalidly inferred, as can be seen by a counterexample. I argue that Craig is mistaken on all counts, and that Adams' argument emerges unscathed
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DOI 10.2307/2953725
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Ken Perszyk (2013). Recent Work on Molinism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.

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