David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):203-217 (2002)
A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.
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Marion Godman (2013). Psychiatric Disorders Qua Natural Kinds: The Case of the “Apathetic Children”. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):144-152.
Miles MacLeod & Thomas A. C. Reydon (2013). Natural Kinds in Philosophy and in the Life Sciences: Scholastic Twilight or New Dawn? [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):89-99.
Miles MacLeod (2013). Limitations of Natural Kind Talk in the Life Sciences: Homology and Other Cases. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):109-120.
Nick Haslam (2010). Symptom Networks and Psychiatric Categories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):158-159.
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