David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141 (2013)
In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism is most faithful to the central internalist intuition. I argue that Huemer’s self-defeat argument fails, that classical foundationalism is able to accommodate fallible introspective beliefs, and that classical foundationalism captures a relatively clear internalist intuition. I also show that the motivation for phenomenal conservatism is less than clear
|Keywords||Phenomenal Conservatism Classical Foundationalism Internalism|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
Laurence BonJour (1978). Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
Laurence BonJour (2001). The Indispensability of Internalism. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):47-65.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
Citations of this work BETA
John M. DePoe (2012). Bergmann's Dilemma and Internalism's Escape. Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.
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