Swinburne's Modal Argument for Dualism

Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):366-370 (1998)
Most critics of Richard Swinburne’s modal argument for mind-body substance dualism have alleged that the argument is unsound, either because its premises are false or because it commits a modal fallacy. I show that the argument is epistemically circular, and thus provides no support for its conclusion even if it is sound.
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil199815331
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