David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:312 - 318 (1986)
The paper provisionally accepts the goal of Goldman's primary epistemics, which is to seek reliability values for basic cognitive processes, and questions whether such values may plausibly be expected. The reliability of such processes as perception and memory is dependent on other aspects of cognitive structure, and especially on one's "conceptual scheme," the evaluation of which goes beyond primary epistemics (and its dependence on cognitive science) to social epistemics, or indeed to traditional epistemology and philosophy of science. Two general arguments against the plausibility of determining reliability values for the basic cognitive architecture of humans are proposed, one applying Fodor's distinction between input and central systems, and the other invoking a point by Geertz about culture and evolution. Social epistemics is only briefly evaluated, as it is nascent.
|Keywords||Primary epistemics Social epistemics Basic cognitive architecture Input vs. central systems Belief-fixer Method-fixer Cultural dependence of cognition Fodor, J A Geertz, C Goldman, A I|
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