David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press (2005)
In preparation for examining the place of introspective evidence in scientific psychology, the chapter begins by clarifying what introspection has been supposed to show, and why some concluded that it couldn't deliver. This requires a brief excursus into the various uses to which introspection was supposed to have been put by philosophers and psychologists in the modern period, together with a summary of objections. It then reconstructs some actual uses of introspection (or related techniques, differently monikered) in the early days of experimental psychology. It distinguishes broader and narrower conceptions of introspection and argues that recent critics have tended to misdescribe how introspection was supposed to work. Drawing upon the broader conception of introspection, it argues that introspective reports are ineliminable in perceptual psychology. It concludes with some examples of such ineliminable uses of introspective reports in both earlier and recent perceptual psychology.
|Keywords||Introspection Psychology of perception Psychophyics Transparency of mental states Wilhelm Wundt Gestalt psychology First-person reports Experimental psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Soteriou (2013). The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action. OUP Oxford.
Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich (2010). Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.
Uljana Feest (2012). Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness. Inquiry 55 (1):1 - 16.
Gary Hatfield (2007). The Reality of Qualia. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3 - 4.
Similar books and articles
Edouard Machery (2005). You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.
Amy Kind (2003). Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Gary Hatfield (1992). Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press 200–227.
Christopher S. Hill (1988). Introspective Awareness of Sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
Arthur E. Falk (1975). Learning to Report One's Introspections. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):223-241.
Jakob Hohwy (2011). Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability. Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
Jeffery Geller (1988). Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy. Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.
Gary Hatfield (2003). Psychology Old and New. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870–1945. Cambridge University Press 93–106.
Gary C. Hatfield (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads100 ( #37,476 of 1,789,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)37 ( #21,961 of 1,789,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?