The reality of qualia

Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168 (2007)
This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and 'ordinary' grounds. I distinguish my representative realism from sense-data theories and from recent 'representational' or 'intentional' theories, and I argue that there is no good reason to adopt a physicalist stance that denies the reality of qualia as phenomenally available intentional contents in Brentano's original sense of 'intentionality'.
Keywords Ontology  Qualia  Color constancy  Color dispositionalism  Intentionality  Sense data  Intentionalism  Representatve realism
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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