The reality of qualia
Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168 (2007)
| Abstract | This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and. | |||||||||
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Sydney Shoemaker (1991). Qualia and Consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.
Clare Batty (2010). Scents and Sensibilia. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
B. van Heuveln, Eric Dietrich & M. Oshima (1998). Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument. Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249.
Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Torin Alter (2003). Qualia. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
Edward Averill (2012). The Phenomenological Character of Color Perception. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):27-45.
Ted Honderich (1992). Seeing Qualia and Positing the World. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Anthony Everett (1996). Qualia and Vagueness. Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
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