A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):145 - 151 (2008)
A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism, thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy. This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections
Keywords Physicalism  Zombies  Qualia
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    References found in this work BETA
    John Hawthorne (2002). Advice for Physicalists. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):17-52.
    Robert Stalnaker (2002). What is It Like to Be a Zombie? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 385--400.
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