Causation, agency, and independence

Philosophy of Science 64 (4):25 (1997)
Abstract
This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative "independence" theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties
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    Federica Russo (2011). Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):85 - 107.
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