David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001)
The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong AI, Searle says, “the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states” (1980a, p. 417). Searle contrasts strong AI with “weak AI.” According to weak AI, computers just simulate thought, their seeming understanding isn’t real understanding (just as-if), their seeming calculation is only as-if calculation, etc. Nevertheless, computer simulation is useful for studying the mind (as for studying the weather and other things)
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Koji Tanaka (2004). Minds, Programs, and Chinese Philosophers: A Chinese Perspective on the Chinese Room. Sophia 43 (1):61-72.
Steffen Borge (2007). A Modal Defence of Strong AI. In Dermot Moran Stephen Voss (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy. The Philosophical Society of Turkey 127-131.
Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A Note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
Andrew Melnyk (1996). Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI. Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
Larry Hauser (2003). Nixin' Goes to China. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press 123--143.
Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #67,463 of 1,699,588 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #128,702 of 1,699,588 )
How can I increase my downloads?