Don't go there: Reply to Crooks
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):223-232 (2002)
From the fact that experiencing is in the head, nothing follows about the nature, location - or even the existence - of the experiencing's presumed object. It does not follow that direct realism "cannot possibly be true" ; much less that "that the experienced world is wholly locked up within one's brain"; much less still, that it must be "located" in in some spiritual "place" outside of physical space or some "higher-dimensional space " . Direct realism is not only consistent with all the known neurophysiological facts, it coheres far better with surrounding and grounding science - and the neuroscience itself - than the Smythian alternative towards which Crooks tends; and it may be had for a reasonable naïve phenomenological cost
|Keywords||Dualism Location Metaphysics Mind Naive Realism Crooks, M|
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