Behavior And Philosophy 23 (2):42-47 (1995)
|Abstract||Hauser defends the proposition that public languages are our languages of thought. One argument for this proposition is coincidence of productive (i.e., novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another is phenomenological experience. A third is Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle."|
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