Gödel's program revisited part I: The turn to phenomenology

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):529-590 (2006)
Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel's own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology
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DOI 10.2178/bsl/1164056807
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Dagfinn Føllesdal (1969). Husserl's Notion of Noema. Journal of Philosophy 66 (20):680-687.

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Charles Parsons (2010). Gödel and Philosophical Idealism. Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2):166-192.

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