Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):529-590 (2006)
|Abstract||Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel's own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology|
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