Hume's knave and nonanthropocentric virtues

This essay offers a critical assessment of environmental virtue ethics (EVE). Finding an environmental ethical analogy with Hume’s critique of the sensible knave, I argue that EVE is limited in much the same way as morality is on the Humean view. Advocates of nonanthropocentrism will find it difficult to engage those whose virtues comport them to anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, EVE is able to ground confidence in nonanthropocentric virtues by explicating specific key virtues, thereby holding open the possibility of bridging the motivational gap between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism.
Keywords Hume  Virtue  Nonanthropocentrism  Environmental virtue ethics  Pluralism  Moral disagreement  Moral education  Humility  Wonder  Non-eudaimonistic end
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DOI 10.1007/s10806-009-9188-z
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