Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):325 – 331 (2007)
|Abstract||The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
P. Menzies (ed.) (1991). Response Dependent Concepts. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 1.
Nick Zangwill (2003). Against Moral Response-Dependence. Erkenntnis 59 (3):285 - 290.
Nenad Miščević (2006). Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence. Acta Analytica 21 (1):3-32.
Jussi Haukioja (2006). Why the New Missing Explanation Argument Fails, Too. Erkenntnis 64 (2):169 - 175.
Peter Menzies (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections. In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Philip Pettit (1999). A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):21-44.
Frank A. Hindriks (2004). A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
Frank A. Hindriks (2006). Acceptance-Dependence: A Social Kind of Response-Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
Christine Tappolet & Roberto Casati (1998). Response-Dependence. European Review of Philosophy 3:227.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #61,589 of 549,594 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,594 )
How can I increase my downloads?