David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In M. E. Reicher & J. C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (2004)
It is often thought that Blackburn and Boghossian have provided an effective reply to the finiteness objection to dispositional theories of meaning, presented by Kripke's Wittgenstein. In this paper I distinguish two possible readings of the sceptical demand for meaning-constitutive facts. The demand can be formulated in one of two ways: an A-question or a B-question. Any theory of meaning will give one of these explanatory priority over the other. I will then argue that the standard reply only works if B-questions are seen as prior, while the dominant dispositionalist theories of meaning see A-questions as prior
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Brian Bix (2003). Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy? Ratio Juris 16 (3):281-295.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
John Humphrey, With Factualist Friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein Needs No Enemies: On Byrne's Case for Kripke's Wittgenstein Being a Factualist About Meaning Attributions.
Ronald Loeffler (2009). Neo-Pragmatist (Practice-Based) Theories of Meaning. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):197-218.
Carl Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
Jakob Hohwy (2003). A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism About Meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.
Martin Montminy (2005). Meaning Skepticism and Normativity. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
Paul Coates (1997). Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation. Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads114 ( #14,742 of 1,699,821 )
Recent downloads (6 months)36 ( #15,982 of 1,699,821 )
How can I increase my downloads?