Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):41-47 (1995)
|Abstract||Hauser defends the proposition that our languages of thought are public languages. One group of arguments points to the coincidence of clearly productive (novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another group relies on phenomenological experience. A third group cites practical and methodological considerations: Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle" (other things being equal, look under the lamp) that motivate looking for instantiations of outer languages in thought first|
|Keywords||Epistemology Natural Language Psychology Thought Abbott, B Hauser, L|
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