Phenomenal causes
Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1):63-70 (1984)
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Janet Levin (2006). What is a Phenomenal Concept? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Michael Huemer (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.
Stephen L. White (2006). Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Joseph Levine (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
E. Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
Derek Ball (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Bénédicte Veillet (2012). In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.
Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. In C. Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oxford University Press.
Robert Schroer (2010). Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
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