Rigidity and actuality-dependence

Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410 (2012)
Abstract
It is generally assumed that rigidity plays a key role in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of identity statements, both between proper names and between natural kind terms. However, while the notion of rigid designation is well defined for singular terms, there is no generally accepted definition of what it is for a general term to be rigid. In this paper I argue that the most common view, according to which rigid general terms are the ones which designate the same kind in all possible worlds, fails to deliver a posteriori necessities. I also present an alternative view, on which the work of explaining a posteriori necessities is not done by rigidity, but by a related metasemantic notion, which I call actuality - dependence
Keywords Rigidity  Modality  Identity  Kripke
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Devitt (2005). Rigid Application. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139--165.
S. Gelman (2004). Psychological Essentialism in Children. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):404-409.

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