Rationality and Knavery

Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:67-79 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper makes a modest point. Suppose one wants to evaluate alternative policies, institutions or even constitutions on the basis of their consequences. To do so, one needs to evaluate their consequences and one needs to know what their consequences are. Let us suppose that the role of economic theories and game theory in particular is mainly to help us to use information we already possess or that we can acquire at a reasonable cost to judge what the consequences will be. We do not necessarily need true theories or theories that provide perfectly precise predictions. What sort of accuracy and precision we need depends on how the consequences of alternative policies are evaluated. The worth of an economic theory in this context of policy assessment depends on the accuracy of the predictions the theory permits, the costs of gathering the needed information, and the costs of learning and using the theory. My only excuse for uttering these truisms is that well known economists and philosophers have denied them

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
Choices, consequences and desert.Teun J. Dekker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):109 – 126.
The Philosophical Basis of Cost-Risk-Benefit Analyses.David A. Bantz - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:227 - 242.
Epistemic value theory and information ethics.Don Fallis - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (1):101-117.
The consequences of taxation.Joel Slemrod - 2006 - Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (2):73-87.
Evolutionary games without rationality?Martin Bunzl - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
29 (#518,760)

6 months
1 (#1,444,594)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Hausman
University of Wisconsin, Madison

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references