David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330 (2010)
Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive” and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility.
|Keywords||Realization Determination Determinable/determinate relation Mechanism Mind-body problem Reduction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas Keaton & Thomas W. Polger (2014). Exclusion, Still Not Tracted. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):135-148.
Similar books and articles
Ronald P. Endicott (2005). Multiple Realizability. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference
Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence Shapiro (2008). Understanding the Dimensions of Realization. Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):213-222.
Agustín Vincente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.
Ronald P. Endicott (2010). Realization, Reductios, and Category Inclusion. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219.
Thomas W. Polger (2010). Mechanisms and Explanatory Realization Relations. Synthese 177 (2):193 - 212.
Agustín Vicente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.
Thomas W. Polger (2007). Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Sungsu Kim (2011). Multiple Realization and Evidence. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
Added to index2009-05-23
Total downloads89 ( #45,259 of 1,793,151 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #89,602 of 1,793,151 )
How can I increase my downloads?