David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Zombies recently conjured by Searle and others threaten civilized philosophy of mind and scientific psychology as we know it. Humanoid beings that behave like us and may share our functional organizations and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeups without qualetative conscious experiences, zombies seem to meet every materialist condition for thought on offer and yet -- the wonted intuitions go -- are still disqualefied from being thinking things. I have a plan. Other zombies -- good zombies -- can battle their evil cousins to a standoff. Perhaps even defeat them. Familiar zombies and supersmart zombies resist disqualefication, making the world safe, again, for materialism. Behavioristic materialism. Alas for functionalism, good zombies still eat programs. Alas for identity theory, all zombies -- every B movie fan knows -- eat brains
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Torin Alter (2007). Imagining Subjective Absence: Marcus on Zombies. Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.
Robert Kirk (2006). Zapping the Zombies. Think 5 (13):47-58.
Charles T. Tart (1995). Yes, We Are Zombies, but We Can Become Conscious. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):361-364.
Daniel Giberman (2015). Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability? Mind 124 (493):121-146.
Yujin Nagasawa (2008). Review of Kirk's Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49:170-171.
Moti Mizrahi (2013). Why the Argument From Zombies Against Physicalism is Question-Begging. The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95.
Robert Kirk (ed.) (2006/2007). Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Jacek Jarocki (2013). David Chalmers’ Argument for the Logical Possibility of Zombies. Roczniki Filozoficzne 61 (1):23-42.
Eric Marcus (2004). Why Zombies Are Inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.
David Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag
Robert Kirk (1974). Sentience and Behaviour. Mind 83 (January):43-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads116 ( #30,892 of 1,790,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #198,360 of 1,790,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?