Revealed preference, belief, and game theory
Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115 (2000)
| Abstract | The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken. | |||||||||
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