The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089 (2006)
��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the ﬁrst and third principles in their justiﬁcations, but not to the second. This ﬁnding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justiﬁcation, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
John Mikhail (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen (2009). Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment. Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw (2014). Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning. Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.
Similar books and articles
Fiery Cushman & Liane Young (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene (2010). Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
Hanno Sauer (2011). Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
Jeffery Smith & Wim Dubbink (2011). Understanding the Role of Moral Principles in Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 21 (2):205-231.
Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, J. I. N. Kang-Xing & John Mikhail (2007). A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications. Mind and Language 22 (1):1–21.
Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Usable Moral Principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge
David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
Jonathan Haidt (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Psychological Review 108 (4):Psychological Review.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2012). ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’. Theory and Research in Education 10 (1):3--25.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads82 ( #48,548 of 1,790,533 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #69,299 of 1,790,533 )
How can I increase my downloads?