David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 76 (3):395-402 (2012)
A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as regularity , is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition and with the essential feature of Williamson’s example
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References found in this work BETA
Ruth Weintraub (2008). How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads? A Reply to Williamson. Analysis 68 (299):247–250.
Timothy Williamson (2007). How Probable Is an Infinite Sequence of Heads? Analysis 67 (3):173 - 180.
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