Mind 118 (470):377 - 397 (2009)
|Abstract||In his seminal paper 'Assertion', Robert Stalnaker distinguishes between the semantic content of a sentence on an occasion of use and the content asserted by an utterance of that sentence on that occasion. While in general the assertoric content of an utterance is simply its semantic content, the mechanisms of conversation sometimes force the two apart. Of special interest in this connection is one of the principles governing assertoric content in the framework, one according to which the asserted content ought to be identical at each world in the context set (the Uniformity principle). In this paper, we present a problem for Stalnaker's meta-semantic framework, by challenging the plausibility of the Uniformity principle. We argue that the interaction of the framework with facts about epistemic accessibility--in particular, failures of epistemic transparency--cause problems for the Uniformity principle and thus for Stalnaker's framework more generally|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Rabern (2012). Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value. Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
Robert J. Stainton (2006). Terminological Reflections of an Enlightened Contextualist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):460–468.
Barbara Abbott (2008). Presuppositions and Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):523-538.
Stephan Torre (2010). Centered Assertion. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.
John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor (2011). Assertion and Epistemic Opacity. Mind 119 (476):1087-1105.
Mahrad Almotahari & Ephraim Glick (2011). Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency. Mind 119 (476):1067-1086.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads111 ( #5,103 of 556,895 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #13,189 of 556,895 )
How can I increase my downloads?